

Not Dependency, But Complementary: Still How Can the Independent State be Strong Enough to Manage both Internal and External Relations?

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1. Introduction

This short paper is aimed at transcribing my comment on the Big Session 2: 'Colonialism and Decolonization in Asia Reconsidered'. I, as a sole commentator, tried to show what we had generally discussed and presumably needed to discuss more. Here, I duplicate what I have talked with least emendation. Not only because it is an adequate task for a role of commentator. But also I believe that some topics of which I have made an issue such as British unilateralism, development autocrat and sovereignty are still worth an open debate.

As follows, I show a basic assumption of the session and then raise several questions in both international and local contexts. For reference, I attach 6 Figures of Power Point's slides for my presentation.

2. Basic Assumption

First, I show the basic assumption of the session. In the centre of the Figure 1, I made a note of the word of complementary. In a word, what we had talked was all about such kind of Asian experience, or in Shigeru Akita's word, 'unique and autonomous experiences'.

Obviously, this view is quite different from the authorized concept of what we call dependency theory. The theory examines a subordinate structure of the world economy between core and periphery. On the contrary, in what I call complementary theory, the local actors did not or would not subordinate to the international economy. In many cases, they could show their initiative and capacity enough to be a negotiator, not the subordinated. Accordingly, the speeds and degrees of economic growth were not decided by dependency structure. It was in reality due to the extent of the complementary advantage of which the local state could take.

Of course, there is a lot of argument about dependency theory and its counter. But the tangible data and stories vividly pictured by four speakers were clearly casting a negative vote against the old school. This is, I think, the most creative and arguable point that the session has




Figure 1

presented.

Based on the complementary theory, the speakers then follow to reconsider colonialism and decolonization. The most striking point lies at understanding of the time-scale and diversified perspective. As Tom Tomlinson has stressed in his conclusion, all the speaker may consent to situate the whole stories of colonialism and decolonization in the long-term continuity of economic relation since the 1930s, perhaps, from even the late nineteenth century. And they regard such relation as a multilateral process of finance and commerce which the British hegemony could provided with. It means that the speakers more or less count not so much the impact of the Second World War as the economic recovery from the Great Depression. Similarly it is not bilateralism but multilateralism to be reconsidered in terms of British economic order. (See the left part of the Figure 2)

To reconsider colonialism in necessity brings about another relevant issue; the role of nationalism during the age of decolonization. All speakers recognize that external factors to establish British supremacy were constantly creating the controversy among the local society, which was very often actualized as a pressure to the central regime. But it is not enough to understand the rise of nationalism as exclusive forces to confront such pressure. Rather, nationalism was for the local elites a kind of principle to be strong enough to manage the situation.

Colonialism and Decolonization Reconsidered

**① Colonialism Reconsidered
Continuity of Economic Relation**

continuity since 1930's
impact of WW2
multilateral finance & commerce
bilateralism



**Colonialism & decolonization
in the long-term continuity of
complementary economic
relation**

**② Decolonization Reconsidered
Role of Political Nationalism**

external factors
pressure to central regime
controversy among local societies
state capacity and negotiation
internal and external relation
legitimacy of the independent state



**Complementary again between
nationalism and economic relation**

Figure 2

To cope with the given international public goods, to control the controversy and to distribute the 'national' interests in the local society were fundamental functions to be expected for newly rising states. It was after all a legitimacy of the independent state (See the right part of the Figure 2).

Equally important was that the ex-colonizing state such as Britain knew the situation. Britain encouraged the independent states to be moderately strong to control the local controversy and to share the complementary benefit along with the needs of 'Gentlemanly Capitalism'. And also, it was an age of shifting global polarity. As Nehru's performance and 'Brazilian Game' would suggest, the local actors could watch for a chance to take the initiative in international rivalry and multilateralism and strengthened their ability to recover the economic difficulty from 1929.

So each presentation with each topic can be said to achieve a significant convergence of reconsidering Asian unique experiences. The authorized concept of dependency is reconsidered with a special attention to the complementary relation. Colonialism is also situated in the long-term continuity of the international economy. The role of nationalism is consequently re-examined. Most of all, it is such an organic link of each presentation.

How do we make the mission completed?

Some remark from International and African perspectives

- A. Dependency relation reconsidered \Rightarrow complementary relation
- B. Colonialism reconsidered \Rightarrow continuity of economic relation
- C. Decolonization reconsidered \Rightarrow role of political nationalism

Mission Completed!

But not without reservation...

Key: State Competence

How can the independent state be strong enough
to manage both internal and external relations?

Remarks on both the international and local contexts

Figure 3

3. International Context Reconsidered

Although the session gives it careful consideration, it may be inevitable that every theory has an aporia. No exception for the complementary theory. Setting out a basic direction for further discussion, I do not hesitate to say that a key factor should lie at the state capacity. In other words, I am not arguing against the complementary theory. But I am still wondering how the independent state can be strong enough to manage both internal and external relations.

First, let's see the international context. As Tomlinson rightly points out, the British officials, while encouraging the strong local regime to share public goods, always wanted to establish her supremacy to link the rising states to the West. Depending to the situation, the British officials not only kept a principle of international cooperation to set a financial and commercial 'Game'. But they also had to use every unilateral exertion, which the local society quite often perceived as like a bilateral pressure to establish the 'Rule'. In a word, the British officials would use both carrots of multilateral internationalism and sticks of unilateral assertion as the situation might demand.

I know that the discourse on multilateralism is so complicated. Definitions are as abundant as stars. Here, I just only refer to a scholar of international politics, Takita Kenji, and




Figure 4

point out some questions by using the matrix of the Figure 4.¹

According to Takita, multilateralism and bilateralism as confront concept are essentially notion of the international economy to refer the number of the states in global economy or the framework of the settlement of trade accounts and finance. But a kind of definitional confusion seems to happen when we incorporate such term into diplomatic analysis. Since the multilateral framework has underlying character to enlarge mutual interest in cooperative manner, people tend to use the term of multilateralism by referring not only to the number of the states but also to the decision making system or, to put it simply, diplomatic attitude. The term of multilateralism is so getting used as somewhat moderate diplomacy to counter pose unilateralism as an aggressive diplomacy. As far as the diplomatic attitude is concerned, the confront idea of unilateralism is actually international cooperation.

So the speakers of the Big Session 2 seem to have a similar dichotomous view between multilateralism and unilateralism. It is fine in itself. But when they are coming to attach importance to the complementary benefit in the multilateral framework of finance and

1 The matrix of the Figure 4 is based on the following. Kenji Takita (滝田賢治), 'Redefinition of Multilateralism and American Foreign Policy (「多国間主義の再定義とアメリカ外交——協調主義と単独主義の相克」『国際政治』)', *the Journal of International Relations*. 133 (2003), pp.15-19.

commerce, the result is rather problematic; the unilateral dimension in such a multilateral order is scarcely examined. For instance, the colonial development policy which had been formulated with the very onset of the Great Depression was little open for discussion in the session. It was the colonial development policy that had been regarded as an effective tool to make the strong economic linkage with her (ex-) colonies to British centered international economy.

Consequently, I tried to reconfirm the necessity for referring to unilateral dimensions in British global power.² And I even presume to say that British colonialism is not really multilateral internationalism. Behind a polite face, it has another face to be multilateral unilateralism. The complementary theory can be plausibly said to have very British perspective and bias of multilateral aspect of economy. But, as indicated in the title of the session, it should be mentioned that we have reconsidered the issues of colonialism and decolonization, even if talking about economic history. At least I can hardly imagine economic history of colonialism without unilateral dimensions. The presentations are still not fully convincing me to regard British 'colonialism' just as a depiction of multilateral internationalism.

Indeed, in Africa, it was not always the case for the local actors to enjoy finance multilateralism as a potential beneficially. Even if they could imagine it, they had to accept a certain amount of unfavorable pressure imposed by external actors to get economic programme like the technical assistance and budget support, later more various financing facilities with the so-called 'conditionality'. Here, the pace of eroding the state capacity became accelerated towards unintended consequence being 'failed state'. And a 'failed state' lost the confidence of managing both internal and external relations. For whatever reason, Africa hardly enjoyed a reciprocal relation.

African experience indicates that unilateral pressures are often involving extra-economic force in multilateral economic order. Here, you do not have to see unilateralism as a confront concept of multilateralism. Cause both the concepts really refer to different axes in the 'Rule of the Game'. And also it is not necessary the case that the word of multilateralism always implies a moderate and indeed reciprocal diplomacy. Cause there is difference in quality from weak attitude to aggressive assertion in diplomacy. Important is to count a combination of the matrix of the 'Rule of the Game'. It means to situate unilateralism (or a bilateral pressure / relationship from the local perspective) in a wider context of British multilateralism. And I think it can be said multilateral unilateralism to draw the most vivid picture of British

2 Ichiro Maekawa (前川一郎), 'Decolonization of the British Empire and Historical Awareness of Responsibilities for the Past' (「イギリス植民地問題終焉論と脱植民地化」永原陽子編『「植民地責任」論——脱植民地化の比較史』青木書店, Aoki Publishing: Tokyo, 2009, pp.278-309.

colonialism or, to say more broadly, British imperial system as a global power. It was the power that allowed only such hegemonic states as UK and USA to exert in history.

This question remains a matter of debate anyway. But it was quite interesting to hear that You-Ping Lee argued somewhat autonomous position of Japan not having supported for British multilateralism. This was a contrasting story of the intra-Asian trade that Akita and Tomlinson explained.

4. Local Initiative Reconsidered

Reconsideration of the international context leads us to another relevant issue; development autocrat and oligarchy regime. In fact, the political independences and the successive statecrafts everywhere were deeply concerned with this issue. The thing is that each autocrat has a different context. Under such variations, what was difference between success and failure of development autocrat? It was likely empirical fact that any ideology of development did not become well-established in Africa. Then why was it so successful in Asia and Latin America? Were there any differences among the successful autocrats? After all, what kind of factors would the independent state need for realizing the ideology of development? How could the independent state response the external pressure and control the local interests?

In the interest of time, the issues did not come up for debate in detail at the session. But it does not mean that the debate has an end. To go one step further, I hasten to add another relevant issue; sovereignty. As a student of international history, sovereignty must be one of the essential issues in colonialism and decolonization. And if we make it seriously, we know that the external relation is not really a relation, rather eroding and constraining pressure to the state capacity.

On this point, a definition by a political theorist, Stephen Krasner, is still worth to hear.³ He says that the term of sovereignty has been used in four different ways. Put simply, international legal sovereignty refers to mutual recognition between the states. Westphalian sovereignty refers to the exclusion of external actors. These sovereignties hold the so-called inter-state system. But for considering the effectiveness of the state capacity, the next two sovereignties are more vital. Domestic sovereignty is the ability to exercise effective control within the borders. And interdependence sovereignty is the ability to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, or capital across the borders of their state.

3 Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1999), chapter one.

(2) Development Autocrat and Sovereignty Local Initiative Reconsidered Again

Developmental autocrat

Strong influence to the statecraft in AA nations with variations
But, ideologies of development in Africa, really?
factors to hold the state capacity?

Sovereignty and quasi-state in Africa

Sovereignty as a decisive factor
for considering political independence

Krasner's definition (1999) Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*
(Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1999).

- 1) International legal sovereignty: mutual recognition among the states
- 2) Westphalian sovereignty: exclusion of external actors
⇒ to hold inter-state system as the given condition
- 3) Domestic sovereignty ⇒ to control internal controversy
- 4) Interdependence sovereignty ⇒ to regulate external relation

Figure 5

Krasner's classification can explain a host of African cases during the age of decolonization. According to an political scientist of Africa, Mitsugi Endo, African states, while recognized by international and Westphalian sovereignties, were consistently forced to lay down domestic sovereignty by a large margin and then managed to use interdependence sovereignty.⁴ But set of circumstances became severer as the external pressure such as bilateral economic aids eroded Westphalian sovereignty, constrained interdependence sovereignty and finally made a political issue of the domestic sovereignty. In short, the independent state in Africa had no choice but to be a quasi-state. 'Failed state' is just a variation as an extreme condition. African states from the first failed in both domestic and interdependence sovereignties. They were barely making it by the conditions of international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty.

4 See Mitsugi Endo (遠藤貢), 'Transformation of the African States and Theoretical and Practical Perspectives' (「アフリカにおける国家変容とその理論的・現実的射程」山脇直司、丸山真人、柴田寿子編『グローバル化の行方』新世社), Saiensu-sha: Tokyo, 2004.




Figure 6

This is really the issue of African state now. For African case, to see only a legal side of international sovereignties shall not be reconsideration at all. We should pay more attention to the effectiveness of sovereignty which may be actualized in domestic and interdependence sovereignties. The thing is how far and in what way African cases shall be different from Asian and Latin American experiences. Some answer is already given by Lewis's presentation, but it leaves much room for discussion.

5. Concluding Remark

To sum up, all the speaker made a convincing case for the complementary relation between local and international contexts. But still the complementation remains a matter of debate. The state capacity to manage both internal and external relations is one of the key factors to understand the issue. The speakers herein had more thing in common than they had differences.

In this context, I feel certain that African cases shall inspire a discussion. It seems to indicate quite contrasting pictures of Asian experience in several aspects. One may wonder which experiences are really thought to be 'unique'. The answer would eventually depend on

how we could grasp the issue with a global perspective. All that is certain is that constructing 'our World / Global History' will not be completed without African experience in the real sense of the term. Comparative studies of development autocrat surely carry forward this. Then again, we may find ourselves obliged to draw a road map to situate colonialism or unilateral influence in a wider context of British multilateral economic order.⁵

5 I take an opportunity to add another word or two about what the terms of colonialism and decolonization may indicate. Since these terms are symbolically used in the title of the session, we should have put thought into this matter at some point or another during the session anyway.

Now, I fully understand that it comes with difficulty to situate the issue of colonial power in the contexts of the international economy or multilateral economic order. I am also aware of the importance of a series of works by Kaoru Sugihara who masterfully explains the pass of economic growth called as 'East Asian Miracle' and the vertically-integrated Cold War strategy. But still I think it remains highly controversial whether or not East Asian case may have one meaning in another case such as African experience. It may have a different case or have no meaning at all. After all, it does matter whether we are talking about East Asian 'unique' experience as a theme or are really going to construct a comparative 'World / Global History'.

On the other hand, we may require more sensitive usage of what is termed decolonization, the term that has quite often taken on a political coloration in an independence movement. To claim worldwide significance in history and somewhat moral meaning of decolonization is essentially different from portraying realities of the political independences. Reconsidering any sort of causal relationships between economic growth and decolonization, we must be carefully concerned with not so much 'what it should be' as 'what it was' in the process of economic growth after independence. Zimbabwean case is one of the examples to indicate such difficult task as this.