

of time, the Coromandel Coast in India.

The administrators in the *Estado da Índia* were also involved in the contracting or purchasing on the spot market, reception, handling (including packing and customs clearance), and loading of commodities shipped from Asia to Portugal and Brazil. They contracted, purchased, and supervised the exportation of commodities on the Crown's account from India, (pepper from the Malabar Coast, diamonds from Golconda, saltpeter from Bengal with the subsequent inclusion of textiles, primarily Gujarati colored cotton textiles). They also controlled the purchase, and supervision of the exportation of commodities on the Crown's account from East Africa (cowries or shells from Mozambique), and China (initially tea and some fine silks) from the direct sales in East Africa, the *Provincia do Norte*, China, the Indonesian Archipelago and the Coromandel Coast. They instructed the monopoly's local representatives in East Africa to purchase gold, ivory, and cowries from the proceeds of those local tobacco sales. The gold, ivory, and cowries were remitted to Goa, where the administrators sold them and added the revenues or proceeds to the monopoly's accounts. When market conditions for cowries in Brazil were not sufficiently profitable or conducive because of stocks being too high, cowries from Mozambique would be exported and sold in India and the proceeds added to the monopoly's accounts and used to pay for other commodities that they were purchasing for Portugal.

It was not until the early eighteenth century that the administrators of the Crown's tobacco monopoly in Goa began to address the commercialization opportunities for Brazilian tobacco and snuff in China and in the Indonesian Archipelago. This is not to say that the Goa contractor had not sold tobacco and snuff to Macau based Portuguese merchants and shipping that normally frequented Goa on an annual basis. It is likely that the Macau based Portuguese shipping carried extremely limited amounts of Brazilian tobacco and snuff at this time to sell in China and throughout the Indonesian Archipelago. The administrators initially identified, as already mentioned, that they would utilize Portuguese Crown officials, the Governors at Macau in China and in Solor and Timor in the Indonesian Archipelago, as the monopoly's exclusive commercial agents. They also decided that they would use Crown shipping, primarily, to deliver the tobacco that would be sold in those markets. When Crown shipping was not available, they would pay for it to be freighted on private merchants' ships.

A brief examination of their efforts in the Indonesian Archipelago illustrates one of the salient characteristics of the Crown's monopoly that was repeatedly replicated in East Africa, China and the Indonesian Archipelago. The characteristic in reference was that proceeds of the small sales in tobacco were never directly remitted to Goa or Lisbon but used to purchase highly fungible and profitable commodities that multiplied the value of the sales of tobacco. This practice increased the

uncle's activities at Macau. See *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maço 104-A, Lisbon, 22/xi/1757. Rodrigo was a Lisbon based merchant that was active in the trade to Asia and China. He was a small shareholder in the *Companhia Geral do Grão Pará e Maranhão*, which traded with China, see *Diário da Navegação de Macau, 1759-1761* (Lisbon: Agência-Geral do Ultramar, 1970), p. 43.

value of tobacco sales and the profitability of this monopoly but, it makes any precise calculation as to the overall profitability of any segment and the consolidation of the trade difficult to estimate.

For example, the Portuguese Governor and Captain-General of Timor and Solor received a paltry amount of 36 arráteis or pounds of *Fino* and *Cidade* tobacco from Goa in early 1706. His instructions were to sell the tobacco, primarily, to local Portuguese settlers and members of the religious orders on those islands. The total value of the tobacco that was sold was around 810 *xerafines* in local currency. With the proceeds of the sale of tobacco, he purchased 6½ *bahars* of local sandalwood (but the quantities and values of the intermediate transactions are indifferent for the point that is being made) that was shipped to Macau, where it was received and sold profitably. With the sales proceeds of the sandalwood, the Portuguese Governor of Macau purchased gold in China, which was shipped to the administrators of the tobacco monopoly at Goa, who sold the gold and paid the freight expenses for its shipment from China to India. With the proceeds of the sale of the gold, they purchased Golconda diamonds valued at 4,665 *xerafines* at Goa, and exported them to Portugal and the Junta in 1709.

### *Merchants as Agents and Administrators*

The administrators were merchants acting as agents of and on behalf of the Crown that performed administrative and commercial functions and were remunerated on the basis of commissions on sales, which is a commonly known typology in the lexicon and characterization of merchants in Portugal and Brazil over this period. Neither the Crown nor others, however, specifically used that term or epithet (*comissários* or commission agents) to describe the administrators. Since they were merchants, albeit, privileged ones, that worked as agents on behalf of another merchant to represent and buy and sell for that merchant, its use would have been accurate. The only difference in this case is that the merchant that these agents represented was the Crown.

The monopoly was a perquisite of the Crown. It is commonly construed in this presentation and elsewhere that the term Crown refers to the respective King of Portugal at the time in reference and in general that form is followed here. It is of fundamental importance to note and register that a significant feature of the Crown's monopoly of tobacco in Asia was that the proceeds were shared by the King (85%) and the Queen (15%). The administrators, therefore, were the agents of both the King and the Queen, until an *alvará* of 17 March 1725. At that date, the Crown appointed the Jesuits in Goa to represent and manage the Queen's interest in the monopoly.<sup>29</sup> For the next thirty odd years, the Queen of Portugal's interests in the monopoly in Asia were not only in the hands of the Jesuits but specifically in the hands of one Jesuit *procurador* or agent, Father António

29 For the *alvará* transferring the responsibility of handling the Queen's interests and accounts to the Jesuits, see the *Junta da Real Fazenda do Estado da Índia, Registro de Alvarás e Cartas Régias*, Livro 9 (Mf 1887), Lisbon, 17/iii/ 1725 and *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maço 99, Caixa 88, *alvará*, Lisbon, 17/iii/ 1725.

Fernandes, until she accepted his retirement in early 1757. Interestingly enough, she did not continue with the agency of the Society of Jesus in 1757, since it institutionally was already under severe attack and criticism in Portugal and throughout the Empire, nor did she revert to using the agency of the Crowns administrators. Rather, she appointed Rama Custam Naique, who most probably was a prominent Hindu merchant, at Goa to represent her.<sup>30</sup> The duration of his agency was short; in 1760, she had appointed a new representative, D. João José de Melo, who was the Crown's treasurer (the *Vedor da Fazenda*) but not an administrator. It is possible and probable that his role was eliminated at the same time when the Crown eliminated the positions of administrators and streamlined the organization of the monopoly in 1774. In addition, in 1694 forward the administrators were instructed and became responsible for purchasing commodities on behalf of the Braganza household, especially pepper and in handling their commercial privileges (for example, the exoneration of payment of customs duties on specific quantities), which had been previously granted by the Crown to the household.<sup>31</sup> While detailed evidence is available to treat the Queen's and the Braganza family household finances within the tobacco monopoly in Asia, because of space and time constraints, these important facets and details are incorporated within and under the rubric of the Crown for the purposes of this presentation.

There were twenty administrators of the monopoly at Goa over the period. Table 2 provides their names and reconstructs the dates of that they held the appointment as the administrators of the monopoly at Goa.<sup>32</sup> At present, data has been found for nearly three quarters of them that provide details as to their social background and careers, prior to, and during their appointment until their death or retirement. A brief revision and synthesis of this data provides an important overview of who they were, where they came from, how they were appointed, and how they benefited from their appointment and status. There are some important parallels and differences with their counterparts in the private sector. The parallels are in their marriage patterns and some of their humbler backgrounds and their social mobility and advancement. The differences are greatest in their access and attainment of privilege and recognition of their social standing by virtue of being in Crown service.

While each aspiring and appointed administrator's career path, obviously, was unique, there are a number of generally common characteristics: maturity, experience, probity, and loyalty. Because of the level of trust and confidence inherent in the appointment, the first two were objectively analyzed and examined and the latter two, generally, were subjectively considered by the Junta in Portugal when examining, qualifying, and deciding upon appointments.

All of the appointed administrators were male and, based upon the available service records,

30 For the *alvará* transferring the responsibility of handling the Queen's interests and accounts to Rama Custam Naique and naming him her *corretor dos negocios*, see the *Junta da Real Fazenda do Estado da Índia, Registro de Alvarás e Cartas Régias*, Livro 9 (Mf 1887), Lisbon, 24/iii/ 1757.

31 For the particular *alvará* in question, see the *Junta da Real Fazenda do Estado da Índia, Registro de Alvarás e Cartas Régias*, Livro 9 (Mf 1887), Lisbon, 17/iii/ 1694.

32 *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maços 96 to 103, annual letter reports.

Table 2: *Administradores da Junta do Tabaco* at Goa, c.1677 to 1774

1. Manoel de Mota (c.1677 to c.1681)	1. Joseph Serrão Pacheco (c. 1677 to c. 1681)
2. Manoel Saraiva de Albuquerque (c. 1681 to 1685)	2. Luís Gonsalves Cotta (c. 1681 to c.23/iv/1683)
3. João Machado (1685 to c. 1700)	3. Manoel Leitão de Andrade (23/iv/1683 to c. 1699)
4. João Borges Corte Real (c.1700 to 17/xii/1726)	4. Manoel Jorge de Oliveira (c. 1699 to 18/iii/1713)
5. António Garcia de Moraes (c. 18/xii/1726 to 26/ii/1729)	5. Sebastião Nunes de Oliveira (18/iii/1713 to 28/ii/1728)
6. João Bauptista Lopes de Laure (8/iii/1729 to 16/x/1740)	6. Salvador Gomes de Brito (2/iii/1728 to 17/viii/1740)
7. Manoel Rodrigues Prestes (17/x/1740 to 9/vi/1747)	7. João de Lemos Fragoso (c. 18/viii/1740 to 3/x/1757, retired)
8. Francisco Coelho Cardoso (c. 10/vi/1747 to 3/x/1757, retired)	8. José de Souza de Vasconcellos (3/x/1757 to 1/viii/1764)
9. Miguel Henriques de Seixas Gurjão (3/x/1757 to 6/ii/1768)	9. Felix Fernandes Braga (1/viii/1764 to 15/i/1774)
10. João de Saldanha Lobo (7/ii/1768 to 25/ix/1769)	
11. Pedro da Costa Bonicho: (26/ix/1769 announced; at Goa: 14/xii/1769 to 15/i/1774)	

respected servants of the Crown with administrative, military (army and/or navy) and/or commercial experience at the time of their appointment. They all entered Crown service in Portugal or in India in their early teens. Their early career paths generally parallel those of contemporary Crown administrators better known for their merchant prowess and involvement in commerce as private entrepreneurs in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds, such as Antonio Coelho Guerreiro and Manuel de Sousa de Meneses.<sup>33</sup> That is to say that generally, they entered Crown service in the military at the lowest or lower echelons as soldiers and over time, slowly occupied positions of increasing responsibilities on land and sea and in positions that they were entrusted in administering Crown monies or properties.<sup>34</sup> In these instances the appointees had already been in Crown service, typically, from ten to fifteen years. The careers of Manoel Leitão de Andrade, Salvador Gomes de Brito, and Francisco Coelho Cardoso are examples of this general tendency. It is a trend that generally insured the Crown with administrators that were mature and experienced. Miguel Henriques de Seixas Gurjão's career path, apparently, was distinctive in that all of his Crown service prior to his appointment as administrator was at sea. Over the 1730s, he captained at least two of the Crown's *Carreira da India* ships, which made the voyage and called at Bahia, the *N.S. da Aparecida e Sto. Antônio* and the *Madre de Deus*.<sup>35</sup>

33 For a discussion of the activities and account books of both of these Crown administrators, see George Bryan Souza, "Portuguese Colonial Administrators and Inter-Asian Maritime Trade: Manuel de Sousa de Meneses and the *Fateh Moola* Affair," *Portuguese Studies Review*, 12: 2 (2004-2005), pp. 25-62; and Joseph C. Miller, "Capitalism and Slaving: The Financial and Commercial Organization of the Angolan Slave Trade, according to the Accounts of Antonio Coelho Guerreiro (1684-1692)," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 17: 1 (1984), pp. 1-56.

34 See notes 33 to 45 below.

35 See Amaral Lapa, *A Bahia e a Carreira da India*, 338; and my reconstruction of the annual shipping and commercial

There was an implicit religious bar in that they were all of Old Christian stock. Many were *reinois* or European born Portuguese. They all were or became known as *morador* or inhabitant and, if married, *casado* at Goa. Those born in India were possibly from mixed marriages and heritage. A few were minor nobles or *fidalgos* or sons of *fidalgos*. There was one case that of Manoel Jorge de Oliveira and Sebastião Nunes de Oliveira that is suggestive of nepotism on two counts. Manoel Jorge de Oliveira was the second son of Manoel Jorge Carvalho a *fidalgo* whose services for the Crown had included a number of positions of importance related to handling the provisions of supplies to the Court and the administration of taxes on meat amongst others during a career that spanned a minimum of eighteen years in Portugal. Manoel Jorge's elder brother, Henrique Jorge de Oliveira, had already been inducted into the Order of Christ in recognition of his father's services and the Crown had dispensed the family's impediment of a mechanical past. Manoel Jorge's request for the same recognition and dispensation from the Crown was granted. Subsequently, towards the end of his life and after a long career as an administrator, Manoel Jorge de Oliveira petitioned the Crown that his son, Sebastião Nunes de Oliveira, be permitted to succeed him as an administrator. The Crown acquiesced to the request and Sebastião Nunes de Oliveira became an administrator of the monopoly upon the death of his father in 1713.<sup>36</sup>

There also appears to have been an explicit color bar. In his letter in response to a Crown request to examine, comment, and evaluate upon the existing the listed administrator appointees in two succession letters in 1717, D. Christovão de Moura, the superintendent of the monopoly replied to the Crown in no un-certain terms that one of the appointees was not qualified, since he was a *mulatto* or mixed heritage. He also added that the manner in which the listed appointee occupied himself commercially and socially made the person unsuitable for the appointment.<sup>37</sup>

There is irrefutable evidence that the administrators were privileged members of society as thirteen out of the twenty can be located and confirmed as being members of one of the most prestigious military orders of Portugal, the Order of Christ.<sup>38</sup> They were: Manoel de Mota,<sup>39</sup> Joseph Serrão

activity of the *Carreira da Índia* from 1674 to 1774 from the *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maços 96 to 103, annual letter reports and the annual cargo accounts from 1752 to 1767 found in the *Junta da Real Fazenda do Estado da Índia*, Livro 85 (Mf 2361).

36 For the *alvará* granting Crown permission for this to occur, see the *Junta da Real Fazenda do Estado da Índia*, *Registro de Alvarás e Cartas Régias*, Livro 9 (Mf 1887), Lisbon, 23/iii/1713; and for details concerning the Oliveira's, see notes 37 and 38 below.

37 See *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maço 98, Caixa 87, Goa, 12/i/1717.

38 See Francis A. Dutra, "Membership in the Order of Christ in the Seventeenth Century: Its Rights, Privileges, and Obligations," *The Americas*, 27: 1 (1970), pp. 3-25; and Fernanda Olival's recent work. I wish to acknowledge and thank Professors Dutra and Olival for their help in locating some of these references for the involvement of the administrators of the Crown's tobacco monopoly with the Order of Christ.

39 Manoel de Mota See *Chancelaria da Ordem de Cristo*, Livro 46, folios 108v-109; for the following documents concerning his background and membership in the Order of Christ: *provisão para ser armado cavaleiro, receber o hábito da Ordem de Cristo e professar na Índia*, 11/xi/1670.

Pacheco,<sup>40</sup> Manoel Saraiva de Albuquerque,<sup>41</sup> João Machado,<sup>42</sup> Manoel Leitão de Andrade,<sup>43</sup> João Borges Corte Real,<sup>44</sup> Manoel Jorge de Oliveira,<sup>45</sup> Sebastião Nunes de Oliveira,<sup>46</sup> Salvador Gomes de Brito,<sup>47</sup> Francisco Coelho Cardoso,<sup>48</sup> João de Lemos Fragoso,<sup>49</sup> José de Souza de Vasconcellos,<sup>50</sup> and

40 Joseph Serrão Pacheco See *Chancelaria da Ordem de Cristo*, Livro 53, folios 170v-171; for the following documents concerning his background and membership in the Order of Christ: *provisão para ser armado cavaleiro, receber o hábito da Ordem de Cristo (com dispensa de mecânica – o avô materno foi marinheiro) e professar na Índia, 26/ii/1675.*

41 Manoel Saraiva de Albuquerque See *Chancelaria da Ordem de Cristo*, Livro 53, folios 262v-263 and *Chancelaria da Ordem de Cristo*, Livro 54, folios 153v-154; for the following documents concerning his background and membership in the Order of Christ: a) his certificate of service; and b) *provisão para ser armado cavaleiro, receber o hábito da Ordem de Cristo (com dispensa de maioridade, tem 57 anos) e professar na Índia, 09/xii/1676.*

42 João Machado See *Chancelaria do Ordem de Cristo*, livro 52, folios 150-150v; 291; 291v; and 292; for the following documents concerning his background and membership in the Order of Christ: a) “Padrão de 12\$ reis de Tença com o Habito, 2/iii/1691”; b) “Carta para se lhe lançar o Habito, 30/x/1691”; c) “Alvará para se armar de Cavalleiro, 30/x/1691” and d) “Alvará de Profissão, 30/x/1691”.

43 Manoel Leitão de Andrade, See *Chancelaria do Ordem de Cristo*, livro 79, folios 452; 452v; 453; for the following documents concerning his background and membership in the Order of Christ: a) “Carta para se lhe lançar o Habito, Lisbon, 10/iii/1689”; b) “Alvará para se armar de Cavalleiro em qualquer Igreja do Estado da India, Lisbon, 10/iii/1689”; and c) “Alvará para professar em qualquer Igreja do Estado da India, Lisbon, 10/iii/1689”. For his certificate of Crown service, *provações, portaria* and the dispensation that he received from the *Mesa da Consciencia e Ordens* to become a member of the Order of Christ, since he was over fifty years old, see *Habilitações do Ordem de Cristo*, Letter: M, Maço 43, Document 24, 16/ii/1689. He petitioned the Crown for permission to pass one of his appointments (the *Corretor* and *Tanadar mór* at Goa) to his inheritor and only grandson, Francisco Manoel Pessoa Coutinho, which was approved in 1701; see *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maço 97, Caixa 84, 25/i/1701.

44 João Borges Corte Real See *Chancelaria da Ordem de Cristo*, Livro 73, folios 479-479v; for *provisão para ser armado cavaleiro, receber o hábito da Ordem de Cristo e professar na Índia, 16/iii/1683.*

45 Manoel Jorge de Oliveira, For his certificate of Crown service, *provações, portaria* and the dispensation that he received from the *Mesa da Consciencia e Ordens* to become a member of the Order of Christ, since his ancestors had a “mechanical past (his paternal grandfather had been an *odreiro* and his maternal grandfather a *sapateiro*), see See *Habilitações do Ordem de Cristo*, Letter: M, Maço 43, Document 12, 8/x/1698.

46 Sebastião Nunes de Oliveira See *Chancelaria da Ordem de Cristo*, Livro 97, folios 308v, and 310v; *provisão para ser armado cavaleiro, receber o hábito da Ordem de Cristo e professar na Índia, 30/i/1707.*

47 Salvador Gomes de Brito: See *Chancelaria do Ordem de Cristo*, livro 30, folio 155v-156v; and livro 52, folio: 379, 379v, and 380, for the following documents concerning his background and membership in the Order of Christ: a) “Padrão de 12\$ reis de Tença com o Habito, 12/i/1693”; b) “Carta para receber o Habito, 18/iii/1692”; c) “Alvará para se armar de Cavalleiro, 18/iii/1692”; and d) “Alvará de Profissão, 18/iii/1692”. For his certificate of Crown service, *provações, portaria* and the dispensation that he received from the *Mesa da Consciencia e Ordens* to become a member of the Order of Christ, since his ancestors had a mechanical past (his father had been a *barbeiro* and his maternal grandmother a *freeiro*?) and that petitioners had to have been in Crown service a minimum of two years to their petition, see *Habilitações do Ordem de Cristo*, Letter: S, Maço 6, Document 10, 11/iii/1692. An extensive and detailed service certificate can be found in *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maço 98, Caixa 86.

48 Francisco Coelho Cardoso Source: *Chancelaria da Ordem de Cristo*, livro 90, folios 448v-449v, 449v-450, and 450-451, for the following documents concerning his background and membership in the Order of Christ: a) “Carta para se lhe lançar o Habito, Lisbon, 17/iii/1717 [error: 1713]”; b) “Alvará para ser armado Cavalleiro na India, Lisbon, 17/iii/1713”; and c) “Alvará para professar na India, Lisbon, 17/iii/1713”. An extensive and detailed service certificate can be found in *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maço 98, Caixa 86.

49 João de Lemos Fragoso Source: *Chancelaria do Ordem de Cristo*, livro 221, folios 264v, 265, and 265v, for the following documents concerning his background and membership in the Order of Christ: a) “Carta para se lhe lançar o Habito, Lisbon, 7/iii/1736”; b) “Alvará para ser armado Cavalleiro na India, Lisbon, 7/iii/1736”; and c) “Alvará para professar na India, Lisbon, 7/iii/1736”.

50 José de Souza de Vasconcellos See *Chancelaria da Ordem de Cristo*, Livro 196, folios 370v-371v; *provisão para ser*

João de Saldanha Lobo.<sup>51</sup> Five claimants had to receive dispensations from the *Mesa da Consciencia e Ordens* to be considered: three (Joseph Serrão Pacheco, Manoel Jorge de Oliveira and Salvador Gomes de Brito) for having ancestors that had a mechanical past and two for being over the age of fifty (Manoel Saraiva de Albuquerque, and Manoel Leitão de Andrade). A few had received this honor, prior to their arrival or shortly thereafter in India through their own merit and/or in recognition of their father's services to the Crown. The larger number received the appointment and had to qualify for it after they had been in service and in Asia. If João Baupista Lopes de Laure's father was Francisco Lopes de Laure, then the administrator, João Baupista Lopes de Laure, was the son of a member of the Order of Christ.<sup>52</sup> But, the relationship between the two still has to be confirmed.<sup>53</sup> One administrator (Salvador Gomes de Brito) was also a *familiar* of the Inquisition at Goa. Some held other minor colonial administrative positions in addition to their appointments as administrators.

The appointment was socially and commercially desirable and it lasted for the successful candidate for the rest of their careers and lives, until this practice was reformed with the forced retirement of both administrators, Francisco Coelho Cardozo and João de Lemos Fragoso, in 1757. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the following was the general *modus operandi* for those who aspired to the appointment: 1) to manifest that interest and obtain letters of nomination from prominent Crown officials and others in Portuguese society; 2) document the candidates service record; and 3) submit to Lisbon the first two for the Junta's consideration. Subsequently, the Junta evaluated the candidates and, periodically, prepared letters of succession and appointment that numbered the successful appointees. Since administrators were appointed for life until this practice was revoked in 1757,<sup>54</sup> it was important that this letter of succession and appointment, which was opened by the superintendent and surviving administrator upon the death of an administrator, contain sufficient numbers of successful appointees, as the successful candidate himself or themselves may have died while waiting for the death of an administrator. There was only one instance that once an aspiring candidate was appointed he chose to relinquish the appointment. This was the case of João de Saldanha Lobo, who was an administrator for a year or so in the late 1760s. He renounced his

amado cavaleiro, receber o hábito da Ordem de Cristo e professar na Luz, 16/vii/1737.

51 João de Saldanha Lobo Source: *Chancelaria do Ordem de Cristo*, livro 235, folios 221v-222, 433v-434, 434-434v and 434v-435, for the following documents concerning his background and membership in the Order of Christ: a) "Padrão de 12\$ reis de Tença com o Habito, Lisbon, 15/iii/1748"; b) "Carta para receber o Habito, Lisbon, 21/iii/1749"; c) "Alvará para se armar de Cavalleiro, Lisbon, 21/iii/1749"; and d) "Alvará de Profissão, Lisbon, 21/iii/1749".

52 João Baupista Lopes de Laure/Francisco Lopes de Laure, see *Chancelaria do Ordem de Cristo*, livro 52, folios 115 and 115v: a) "Carta para se lhe lançar o Habito, 14/iii/1691"; b) "Alvará para se armar de Cavalleiro, 14/iii/1691" 115; and c) "Alvará de Profissão, 14/iii/1691".

53 Manoel Lopes de Laure was a member of the *Junta da Administração do Tabaco* in Lisbon in the early 1720s; as yet, his relationship with either João Baupista Lopes de Laure or Francisco Lopes de Laure or both has yet to be established or clarified.

54 For the *alvará* ordering the retirement of the two standing administrators, see the *Junta da Real Fazenda do Estado da Índia, Registro de Alvarás e Cartas Régias*, Livro 9 (Mf 1887), Lisbon, 1/iv/1757.

position as an administrator, in preference to and after he had been appointed the Royal Treasurer (*Vedor da Fazenda*).<sup>55</sup>

Sales commissions, the source of the administrators' remuneration, were significant. For the individual, they were an elevated and secure source of compensation in an insecure environment. For the Crown, they were a high cost for the management of its interests. Based on the available accounts for forty-eight years over 1700 to 1760, the administrators received a total of 405,049 *xerafines* in commissions or an annual average of 8,440 *xerafines* for both or 4,220 *xerafines* per individual administrator.<sup>56</sup> While there were changes in the method of calculating the commissions and certain exemptions of accounts to be considered in the calculation, from c.1677 to c. 1741, the rate for their commission was 8% and calculated on the tobacco sold in the *rendeiro* contract and by Crown administrators in Asia. Although the Crown successfully negotiated a reduction in the effective commission rate after 1741, their elevated earnings from commissions and the cost of the administrator system to the Crown was a central consideration in the Crown's decision to eliminate the position in 1774.<sup>57</sup>

### *Two Cases: Cowries and Cottons*

This section outlines two cases in which the administrators in India employed their commercial acumen in an independent manner, which shaped the Crown's commercial involvement in the Atlantic world in the eighteenth century. While there is sufficient information and detail to comment on all of the commodities that were involved, the examples of the Crown's commercialization of cowries from Mozambique and cottons from India (Gujarat) at Bahia have been selected as they are particularly important for the role that Afro-Asian commodities played in the Atlantic World.

The administrators of the tobacco monopoly in Asia knew of the commercial utility of cowries from Mozambique in western India. It is not clear if they were or other Portuguese treasury officials in Brazil alerted the Crown that cowries from Mozambique could be traded profitably at Bahia and in the Atlantic World. Although convincing documentary evidence has not been found, it is plausible that private merchants from Brazil with slave trading contacts with Mozambique may have identified and initiated the commercial utility of this commodity by using it as ballast for their ship-

55 For the letter of the Governor of the *Estado da Índia* to the Superintendent of Tobacco explaining the situation and Lobo's decision, see the *Junta da Real Fazenda do Estado da Índia, Registro de Alvarás e Cartas Régias*, Livro 9 (Mf 1887), Panelim, 25/ix/1769.

56 For the annual accounts that permitted this reconstruction, see *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maços 96 to 103, annual letter reports with accounts.

57 For correspondence citing cost as one of the reasons and the *alvará* from Lisbon and a published copy abolishing the positions of the superintendent and administrators in the Crown's Tobacco monopoly and the system that substituted them, see the *Junta da Real Fazenda do Estado da Índia, Registro de Alvarás e Cartas Régias*, Livro 9 (Mf 1887), Lisbon, 15/i/1774 and Goa, 17/x/1774.

ping on the return voyage from Africa to Bahia. Despite the absence of clarity in how this opportunity was identified, the Crown did know of its existence and that private merchants at Bahia had participated in developing this trade. The Crown claimed the commercialization of cowries as its monopoly and established the administrative system for controlling the sales of this commodity by Crown officials in Brazil and India via an *alvará* signed in Lisbon and dated the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 1722.<sup>58</sup>

From 1725 forward, if not the year before, the administrators of the tobacco monopoly in Asia were loading, and exporting cowries from Mozambique on the return ships of the *Carreira da Índia* for Brazil. Using their weight as ballast, the cowries were taken to Bahia where they were off-loaded, warehoused, and sold by Crown officials to private Portuguese/Brazilian merchants. Those merchants would use the cowries as ballast for their shipping and, since cowries were used in particular at Whydah as currency, they accompanied the other items of exchange that this shipping carried, primarily, tobacco, brandy, and contraband gold from Brazil for the slave trade.

When the Crown's captains of the returning *Carreira da Índia* shipping that called at Bahia could not sell all of the cowries that they had delivered before they had to sail with the return fleet for Portugal, the administrators with help from the Junta in Lisbon expanded the services of local Crown treasury officials in the administration, warehousing, and the sale of these cowries at Bahia. Initially, the Crown's ship captains and, subsequently, local treasury officials took the revenues from the sales of shells and purchased and remitted Brazilian gold to the Junta for the administrators in Asia's account on returning *frota* shipping, usually but not obligatorily, from India. The above description took a relatively short amount of time to implement. Although there would be fluctuations in the quantities, frequency of deliveries, and the turnover of cowry stocks at Bahia, this trade was still in place at the time of the elimination of the administrators in India.<sup>59</sup>

Cowries from Mozambique were not a "perfect" item of exchange at Bahia and the Mina Coast. First, they were slightly larger and coarser than cowries from the Maldives in the Indian Ocean, which were the preferred shells involved in this trade;<sup>60</sup> and, second, since they were sold by weight, merchants at Bahia complained occasionally of the amount of sand and, hence, additional weight that was found when they examined stocks of the shells at Bahia.<sup>61</sup> Local market resistance to this item of trade developed. Since these cowries were the property of the Crown and local Crown treasury officials had to sell these stocks and defend their actions to authorities in Lisbon, they

58 For two copies of this *alvará*, which established the monopoly over cowries and the confiscation of existing private merchants stocks at Bahia, see *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maço 99, Caixa 88; and Maço 100-A, Caixa 90, *alvará*, Lisbon, 1/iv/1722.

59 This description of the trade in cowries from Mozambique is based upon the explicit paragraphs, accounts, and correspondence on the subject found in *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maços 96 to 103, annual letter reports with accounts.

60 For the standard work on cowries, see Jan Hogendorn and Marion Johnson, *The Shell Money of the Slave Trade*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

61 For the 1766 report on cowry stocks by the Desembargador Manoel António da Cunha de Sotto Maior, the *Provedor-mor* in Brazil, one of the Crown officials that was responsible for overseeing this trade, and the remedy he ordered that merchants wishing to obtain licenses to trade to the Mina Coast would have to purchase some cowries until all of it was sold, see *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maço 106, Caixa 104, Bahia, 18/iii/1766.

developed ways of coercing merchants via the threat or the actual withholding of sailing licenses, for example, if the stocks of the cowries were not purchased.<sup>62</sup> After having an important interlude in the Atlantic World, by the later half of the eighteenth century, *buzios* from Mozambique ceased to be a significant commodity exported from Africa to India and then to Brazil by the administrators. Although stocks had to be eliminated at Bahia and the Crown examined schemes to continue the trade in the Atlantic World, *buzios* from Mozambique controlled by the administrators generally stayed within the Indian Ocean World's trade circuits in the third quarter of the eighteenth century.

The next and last case to be considered and commented upon is Indian colored cotton textiles at Bahia. From 1751 to 1774, the administrators of the tobacco monopoly in Asia identified that an important percentage of the proceeds from all of tobacco sales in Asia could be profitably employed in the purchase of Indian sourced cotton textiles, primarily from Gujarat and some from Bengal to be sold at Bahia to private merchants for their inclusion in the trade for slaves in Africa, especially at Angola, for local internal market consumption in Brazil, especially but not exclusively for slaves and others in the mines and plantations, as well as a commercial component in the clandestine trade between Brazil and Spanish America at the Colonia de Sacramento and the Rio Plata regions.

Indian cotton textiles had been incorporated historically from nearly the beginning of Portuguese contact with Asia and private merchants at Bahia, Lisbon, and elsewhere had for years incorporated these textiles in their commercial strategies in the Atlantic World. What is being commented upon is the documented Crown involvement initiated by the administrators of the tobacco monopoly in Asia in the trade in Indian cotton textiles in Brazil. From c.1677 to 1750, Indian cotton textiles are never mentioned nor are they registered in the administrator's detailed accounts and cargo manifests of the Afro-Asian commodities that they purchased and loaded on Crown shipping in Asia for Brazil and Portugal. In 1751, the administrators were in a quandary as to how best employ their capital from tobacco sales because of a structural conjuncture in market conditions, primarily, in relation to pepper. They had observed over a series of years an alarming trend in western India and possibly in Europe. The quantity and quality was decreasing and the price was increasing for the available pepper supplies because of competitive and disturbed war-time conditions in some of the western Indian markets. Their comments also suggest that these higher pepper prices were affecting already low profit margins at Lisbon and threatening to make trading in pepper unprofitable. Employing their capital entirely in saltpeter or returning to purchasing diamonds, apparently, was not possible or a discarded alternative, the administrators turned to purchasing Gujarati sourced colored cotton textiles to be sold at Bahia and not at Lisbon. It appears to be an initiative that was conceived by the administrators at Goa.

Initially, they made a series of errors common to inexperienced and novice traders without

62 For a report on how the remedy ordered in 1766 to eliminate stocks was working, see *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maço 108-B, Caixa 114, Bahia, 29/xi/1770.

knowledge of what or how to buy or the preferences and demand for textiles in the consuming markets. They bought the wrong quantities, qualities (sizes and colors), and at prices that were uncompetitive at Bahia. They lost money and the Crown was not pleased. Being informed of their errors from Bahia and Lisbon, they justified their commercial decision, requested and received commercial information that permitted them to remedy their errors. Crown officials interviewed local Bahian based private merchants that were experienced in dealing in Indian cotton textiles and forwarded that information on to the administrators in Goa.<sup>63</sup> Even after market conditions for pepper improved sufficiently for them to return to its inclusion, the administrators continued to intermittently include Bengal, Gujarat, and Coromandel Coast sourced Indian cotton textiles as part of the mixture of commodities in their commercial strategies for export to Brazil until the elimination of their office in 1774.<sup>64</sup>

### Conclusions

This presentation discussed the organization and functioning of the Portuguese Crown's monopoly over the commercialization of Brazilian tobacco. This monopoly provides a fascinating case study of globalization in early modern world history. Out of political economic necessity, the Portuguese Crown harnessed a New World commodity, Brazilian tobacco, and fashioned a monopoly that provided revenues for its metropolitan and imperial requirements.

By making buyers and consumers in Europe, Africa, America, and Asia pay for the pleasure they derived from smoking tobacco and taking snuff, the Crown reduced debt and generated income that it might not have found elsewhere. In metropolitan Portugal, the tobacco monopoly produced around one-sixth to one-seventh of the revenue collected annually by the Crown. In Portuguese Asia, the tobacco monopoly produced over one-eighth of all of the *Estado da Índia's* total annual revenue.

For the *Estado da Índia* and China, although the quantities of tobacco and snuff were small, the revenue that was generated was disproportionately significant and important to imperial fortunes and the maintenance of the Portuguese Empire. By exporting and commercializing Brazilian tobacco, the Portuguese Crown diminished the necessity of remitting silver to Asia. By selling and

63 For the 1751 report by the *Provedor-mor* in Brazil to the Junta in Lisbon on the difficulties encountered in selling the recently arrived Indian cotton textiles, the results of his interview with experienced but un-named Bahian merchants and the importance of this commercial intelligence, which was shared with the administrators in Goa, see *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maço 103, Caixa 96, Bahia, 30/ix/1751. For a list of private merchants (Antônio Pires Monsão, Luis de Silva Pinto, Manoel João Vianna, Felix Manoel Dias, Manoel de Oliveira Freire, Luis Coelho Ferreira, Bernardo da Silva Costa, and João Luis de Deus) who dealt and some of whom were buyers of Indian cotton textiles from the Crown at Bahia in 1759, see *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maços 104, Caixa 97, Bahia, 2/viii/1759.

64 This description of colored Indian cotton textile trade is based upon the explicit paragraphs, accounts, and correspondence on the subject in *Cartas do Brasil e Índia*, Maços 96 to 103, annual letter reports with accounts.

using the proceeds of those sales of tobacco to purchase Afro-Asian commodities that circulated within Asia, Africa and America, the monopoly multiplied its economic impact and importance. Areas of the globe were interconnected in a way and at a level of activity that might not have been present before these contacts. Direct sailings from Portugal to China and China to Portugal were instituted at this time to increase Portuguese trade with China. Although these sailings were not initiated to deliver tobacco and snuff, the monopoly did take advantage of this change in colonial and commercial policy. Despite the shipments of Brazilian tobacco and snuff being extremely small, the use and consumption of snuff in China became increasingly fashionable.

In Brazil and in the Atlantic World, the interconnections that this monopoly fostered in Asia provided a competitive commodity mix of items in demand and that were highly fungible in Africa that contribute towards an explanation for the relative commercial advantage and the longevity of the Portuguese participation in the South Atlantic slave trade in the eighteenth century.